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THE CATHOLIC LAWYER, JULY, 1956
insofar as this means that their intellects
may provide a clearer vision of the dictates
of the natural law, their wills may more
often choose the good, and their acts more
effectually implement their moral decisions.
But it will not be possible for them "to
create moral standards superior to those
their fathers evolved," 23 because man does
not "create" or "evolve" the basic truths of
the natural law. He only recognizes them,
and is under a duty to employ those means
which will best give effect to these truths.
This is not to deny, however, that moral
conclusions, reached by recourse to the
fixed ideals of the natural law, as a major
premise, will vary in accordance with the
ever changing economic, sociological, tech-
nological, scientific, and cultural facts of
the minor premise.
FOUNTAIN- OF JUSTICE, by John C. H. Wu. Sheed and Ward, New York, N. Y., 1955.
Pp. 281. $3.75.t
Reviewed by-
JOHN B. GEST*
. What is meant by law and how many
kinds of law are there? What is natural
law, what is human law, what is the essence
of law, what is the end of law? What are
the relations between the eternal law, the
natural law and positive law?
These are questions posed by Dr. John
C. H. Wu and discussed in the Prologue
of his scholar and very readable book,
Fountain of Justice - A Study in the Nat-
ural Law. In answering these questions,
Dr. Wu gives first a synopsis of his own
philosophy of law which is Christian and
Thomistic.
Dr. Wu is singularly qualified to write
in this field. The philosophy of law and
comparative law have been special studies
for him. When he was a graduate student
at Michigan Law School in 1920, being
then only twenty-one years old, he wrote
23 Id. at 314.
t Reprinted with permission, "Dr. Wu And The
Natural Law," 27 Pennsylvania Bar Association
Quarterly 338 (1956).
'Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
an article for the Michigan Law Review,
"Readings from Ancient Chinese Codes and
Other Sources of Chinese Law and Legal
Ideas." He had heard his professors speak
admiringly of Justice Holmes (then eighty)
and in 1921 he sent the Justice a copy of
the Review. Holmes was much impressed
and from this sprang the correspondence
known as the Holmes-Wu letters, and a
lasting friendship. (See John C. H. Wu,
Beyond East and West, 87 et seq.). In
1921 Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, now
of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, offered young Wu a traveling fel-
lowship in international law under the Car-
negie Endowment, which he accepted for
studies at the Universities of Paris and
Berlin. In 1923 he was a research scholar
in jurisprudence at Harvard University
under the direction of Dean Roscoe Pound.
Returning to China, he became successively,
Professor of Law, then Dean of the Com-
parative Law School, Judge of the Provi-
sional Court of Shanghai and a successful
practicing lawyer. As a member of the Leg-
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islative Yuan, he played an important part
in the drafting of the Constitution of Na-
tionalist China. In 1946 he was appointed
Minister Plenipotentiary from China to the
Vatican. At present he is Professor of Law
at Seton Hall University Law School, South
Orange, New Jersey. He has published
numerous books and articles on law in
Chinese, English, French and German.
Members of the Brandeis Society will recall
(as mentioned on page 278 of his book)
that Dr. Wu spoke at their meeting in
Philadelphia in the winter of 1951 on
"Justice Holmes and the Natural Law."
After stating the above questions and
before answering them, Dr. Wu presents
also another fundamental question: "Why
should we not confine our study to human
law?"-meaning the law that regulates the
transactions and relations between men in
their social life, defining rights and duties,
civil liability and criminal responsibility,
and prescribing remedies. "Why should we
Bring in such things as theology, philosophy,
ethics, sociology, economic theories?" He
answers that the profession of law is not a
mere craft for making a living. He cites
with approval Justice Holmes:
The remoter and more general aspects of
the law are those which give it universal
interest. It is through them that you not only
become a great master in your calling, but
connect your subject with the universe and
catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its
unfathomable process, a hint of the uni-
versal law. I
Dr. Wu goes further. He claims "... there
is no other way of teaching law except in
the grand manner, for the simple reason
that one cannot really know the law with-
out taking account of its sources." He be-
I Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 5 (1955).
lieves that if we delve into the cases we
find (quoting one Henry Finch) "the sparks
of all the sciences are raked up in the ashes
of the law." Neither Dr. Wu nor this re-
viewer would agree with those who hold
that legal magazines should have only arti-
cles whose value may ultimately be reflected
in the income account.
Among the definitions of -law Dr. Wu
finds that of St. Thomas Aquinas the most
adequate.
It is nothing other than a certain rule of
reason for the purpose of the common good,
laid down by him who is entrusted with the
welfare of the community and promul-
gated.
He discusses the eternal law: - God's
Government of all creation according to His
Divine Providence for the good of all; and
the natural law, "a participation in the eter-
nal law by the rational creature," and hu-
man law, which is derived from natural law
both by way of conclusion and by way of
determination of certain generalities.
The discussion of the question whether
the essence of law is in reason or in will
is particularly interesting. Much confusion,
it appears, has resulted from failure to
distinguish between the speculative reason
and the practical reason. The former is the
faculty of reason when its object is one of
the sciences, including the physical sci-
ences, where effects must follow causes by
a necessity of nature. Natural phenomena,
for example, are necessary things because,
under given conditions, they cannot be
other than they are. But as human law
concerns the action of beings endowed with
free will, contingent matters are concerned
and so it comes under the practical reason.
Human law has necessity in general prin-
ciples but not in detailed aolication, which
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involves the evaluation of the end (the
common good), and the selection of means
to attain it. Its essence, therefore, is reason
but the will of the human lawgiver is re-
quired for its actual existence and efficacy.
For example, while to do justice is a neces-
sary principle of natural law, the deter-
mination by the legislator of what is just,
according to Aquinas, must differ accord-
ing to the different conditions of mankind.
Kant and his followers failed in the
fundamental distinction between the specu-
lative reason and the practical reason. In
their school the latter is reduced to will and
sentiment.
The rationalists had claimed for natural
law a complete code for regulating con-
duct down to the smallest details. For them,
under a given state of facts, there could be
only one natural law answer if the truth
were known. They treated law as coming
under the speculative reason. On the other
hand,. the voluntarists, by eliminating rea-
son as the source of law, derived la% from
the arbitrary will of the lawgiver or of the
individual. And so the term "natural law"
was appropriated by various schools which
failed to appreciate the traditional view of
the respective parts of reason and will in
the philosophy of law. Law is, as Dr. Wu
remarks, "a teleological, not a mechanical
science."
Dr. Wu finds that the juridical rationalism
of the eighteenth century led to the jurid-
ical positivism of the nineteenth, which
does not recognize the fundamental moral
law as the source of human positive law.
Apparently it was mostly the false rational-
istic and rigid notion of natural law against
which Justice Holmes revolted, but when
Holmes "made a wholesale denial of nat-
ural law, he fell into Charybdis in shunning
Scylla." Dr. Wu deplored the fact that
Justice Holmes never studied St. Thomas
and I believe he always felt that the Jus-
tice, in his heart, was closer to natural law
than his writings would indicate.
Indeed, it would appear that much of
the modern attack on natural law has been
addressed to the rationalistic or individual-
istic kind of natural law, and not to the
traditional natural law expounded by the
author.
Dr. Wu uses the term "personalism" as
designating natural law political philosophy
because it recognizes the full significance
of the human person, "made to the image
and likeness of God." It treats individuals
as integral-moral persons and establishes
a hierarchy of natural rights, life, liberty
and property. In recognizing both the indi-
vidual and the social nature of man, and
his rights and obligations, it avoids the
errors of collectivism on the one hand and
individualism on the other.
Under the caption "The Natural Law
and Our Common Law," Dr. Wu traces
the origin and development of natural law
principles in England from the days of King
Ethelbert:-through the time of Magna
Carta, the age of Bracton, from the Year
Books to Thomas More, Christopher St.
Germain, Coke, Holt, Mansfield; and in
this country, particularly in the writings of
the Founding Fathers and in the frequent
application by our courts of principles of
natural justice. The treatment of the com-
mon law is particularly interesting because
of the great respect, even enthusiasm, which
the distinguished Chinese scholar has for
our system. He says that:
Nothing is so fascinating as to follow the
fortunes of natural-law philosophy in this
country. Its chief glory is its confirmation of
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the idea that there is a Law higher than
positive laws. In its early days, the Amer-
ican philosophy of the natural law did not
separate itself from religion, and it became
the rock on which a true democracy was
built.2
In a division of the book called "In the
School of Christ," the author shows many
examples of the incorpation in the common
law of principles taught by Christ. He is not
speaking of revelation but rather of the
teaching which could be within the reach
of natural reason. For, as Aquinas says,
the natural law is "participation in the
eternal law by the rational creature." The
author's view is clarified in the following:
The question has often been asked if
Christianity is a part of the common law.
It depends upon what you mean by Christi-
anity. If you mean a revealed religion, a
Faith as defined by the Apostles' Creed, it
is not a part of the common law in the
sense that you are legally bound to believe
in it. Christianity as a Faith comes into the
courts, not as a law, but as a fact to be taken
judicial notice of, on a par with other facts
of common knowledge. On the other hand,
if you mean by Christianity the fundamental
moral precepts embodied in its teachings,
it is part of the common law in the sense
that all the universal principles of justice
written in the heart of every man are a part
thereof. They are not enforced as specific
rules of law but are applied as guiding prin-
ciples whereby laws are made and cases
decided. 3
In the Epilogue the author summarizes
his view of the present situation:
2 Id. at 130.
3 lId. at 215-16.
At present, American jurisprudence is
going through a crucial phase of its evolu-
tion. There is a visible trend toward the
revival of natural-law philosophy, centerc 1
on the dignity of the human person. The
historical situation which has made this
movement not only possible but inevitable
has been very ably described by Chief Jus-
tice Vanderbilt: "There has been a marked
tendency to think of man merely as a cog
in the economic machine. Happily, how-
ever, this tendency seems to have been
checked, in part because of a postwar re-
surgence of interest in religion which ix
fostering a militant faith in the worth of the
individual and his capacity for good, and
in part because of our alarm over the spread
of totalitarian government and its effect on
the individual." As I survey the judicial de-
cisions of contemporary courts in America,
I have grounds for hoping that this resurg-
ence of spiritual idealism is more than a
temporary fashion, that it is the beginning
of a truly glorious age in the history of
jurisprudence.4
As stated by the author, the book is not
a volume of collected legal papers but it
has ajnity of its own. He has drawn liber-
ally upon papers and addresses which he
has published and delivered on various oc-
casions. Dr. Wu's style is engaging and his
writing reflects the vast knowledge he has
acquired in extensive reading in the law
of many countries. At times his ideas seem
to expand beyond the ordinary language of
law and philosophy and burst into poetic
imagery that is pleasant and illuminating.
The book should prove to be a distinct
contribution toward the current revival of
natural law jurisprudence.
4 Id. at 191-92.
